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I. INTRODUCTION
44JN CONTROLLED SEARCH and seizure is one of the first and
.most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. '"
Although passengers flying on commercial airlines expect to
be searched thoroughly at TSA checkpoints, most domestic pri-
vate pilots have become accustomed to a fairly hands-off flying
experience. Americans pilot and fly in private planes in a field
of travel called "general aviation," which encompasses 57% of all
civilian aviation activity in the United States2 and "[c]ontributes
more than $150 billion to the U.S. economy annually."3 Aside
from ramp checks performed by Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) officials, where a pilot is asked to show a few perti-
nent documents without much incident,' general aviation pilots
are usually left alone. That used to be the norm until a spike in
warrantless searches began occurring over the course of 2012
and 2013.6 Suddenly, pilots flying domestic routes to places like
Iowa and Oklahoma were being detained by local law enforce-
ment and subjected to invasive searches by men in tan jump-
suits, later identified as agents from the Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), a sub-agency of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). 6
The CBP has the authority to conduct warrantless searches of
private airplanes via a doctrine known as the "border search ex-
ception."' Developed in 1866 and refined through case law,' the
1 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33194, SECURING GENERAL AVIATION 2
(2005).
3 GEN. AVIATION MFRS. Ass'N, GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICAL DATABOOK & IN-
DUSTRY OUTLOOK (2012), available at http://www.gama.aero/files/GAMA7233
ARFINALLOWRES.pdf.
4 Inspectors of the FAA may conduct ramp checks to inspect airman and medi-
cal certificates. Flight Standards Information Management System (FSIMS), FAA
Order No. 8900.1, 6-89(A) (2), 6-101(D) (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter FAA Order
No. 8900.1].
5 There have been forty-two searches confirmed as of September 2013. David
Patch, Private Pilots Chafe at Surprise Searches: 4th Amendment Concerns at Heart of
Disagreement, TOLEDO BLADE (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/busi-
ness/2013/09/09/Private-pilots-chafe-at-surprise-searches.html.
6 Jim Moore, Pilot Detained, Searched for Mysterious Reasons, AOPA (May 16,
2013), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2013/May/16/Pilot-de-
tained-searched-for-mysterious-reasons.aspx [hereinafter Moore, Pilot Detained].
7 See United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993).
8 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 611-13 (1977) (citing the original
version of what is currently 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2012)).
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border search exception has become the CBP's main source for
searching private aircraft.' However, the border search excep-
tion has limitations; chief among those is that the search must
be conducted at the border or its "functional equivalent." 0
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3), warrantless searches are allowed
at the border or a "reasonable distance" from it." The Attorney
General has prescribed 100 air miles as a "reasonable dis-
tance."" This recent rash of searches has caused an outcry from
general aviation pilots because none of the planes were on inter-
national flights nor within 100 miles of the border.'
This comment will explore the development of the border
search exception and how it pertains to general aviation aircraft.
Part II will provide a timeline of the CBP's recent actions and
interactions with pilots, trade associations, and Congress be-
cause the factual background of this recent trend of domestic
general aviation aircraft searches is important to understanding
the recent searches in a legal context. Part III will explore the
agencies with the authority to search a private aircraft and
sources of that authority. Part IV will outline the border search
exception and its development. Finally, Part V will apply the va-
rious factors of other valid searches by the CBP to the recent
searches, using pilots Gabriel Silverstein and Larry Gaines as ex-
amples. By applying the various border search exception tests to
Mr. Silverstein's and Mr. Gaines's examples, this comment will
demonstrate that the authority under which the CBP purports
to operate is not supported by law.
9 See generally Sharon A. Alexander, Plane View Doctrine? Private Aircraft Searches,
55 J. AIR L. & COM. 443, 498-99 (1989) (discussing usage of border searches by
officials); Katherine Stein, Search and Seizure at Cruising Altitude: An Analysis of the
Re-Born Federal Air Marshals and Fourth Amendment Complications in the Twenty-First
Century, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 673, 687-89 (2005) (discussing the border search
exception).
10 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
ii 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3) (2012).
12 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a) (2) (2014).
13 See, e.g.,James Fallows, Annals of the Security State: More Airplane Stories, AnAN-
TIC (May 21, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2013/05/annals-of-the-security-state-more-airplane-stories/276018.
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II. RECENT ACTIONS BY CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
A. STOP AND SEARCH OF GABRIEL SILVERSTEIN
Two recent and controversial searches by the CPB involved
general aviation pilots Gabriel Silverstein and Larry Gaines.
Gabriel Silverstein was flying back to New Jersey from California
in a Cirrus SR22,14 a very popular single-engine aircraft." After
landing in Iowa City for fuel and taxiing to the ramp, Mr. Silver-
stein and his partner entered the fixed-base operator (FBO).
Looking out from the FBO, Mr. Silverstein saw not only Iowa
City police officers and their canine unit surrounding his air-
craft but also men in tan jumpsuits.'7 He was then informed,
without being asked permission, that they would be conducting
a search with the canine unit that was already circling his
plane.'8 The men in tan jumpsuits gave Mr. Silverstein three
choices: (1) stand quietly near his aircraft while his belongings
were strewn about the runway, (2) wait inside the FBO, or (3)
spend the afternoon in handcuffs.' 9 Partway through the search,
an officer "advised him to confess to possessing a little personal-
use dope [so that] it'll be all over and easy."20 The officer com-
miserated with Mr. Silverstein (who has long hair and a chest-
length beard), stating that he did not think marijuana should be
illegal and that he was just doing his job.2 ' Unbeknownst to the
officer, Mr. Silverstein is a teetotaler, so he had neither drugs
nor alcohol on board.2 2 After a two-hour ordeal, which included
officers removing and rifling through all of Mr. Silverstein's and
his partner's belongings, the officials told Mr. Silverstein he was
free to go.23 Mr. Silverstein was then left to gather and repack
14 Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
15 See GEN. AVIATION MFRs. Ass'N, supra note 3, at 18.
16 An FBO is "an airport-based business which parks, services, fuels and may
repair aircraft; [and] often rents aircraft and provides flight training. The term
was coined to differentiate FBOs from businesses or individuals without an estab-
lished place of business on the airport." ABCs of Aviation, AOPA, http://www.
aopa.org/Pilot-Resources/Safety-and-Technique/Operations/ABCs-of-Aviation.
aspx (last visited June 1, 2014); Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
17 Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Patch, supra note 5.
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his things.24 Later, Mr. Silverstein saw a picture of the CBP's
logo and recognized it as the same logo that appeared on the
chests of the officers who had ransacked his aircraft.
B. STOP AND SEARCH OF LARRY GAINES
Like Gabriel Silverstein, Larry Gaines was flying west-to-east in
his J35 Bonanza, a single-engine aircraft.26 He was flying with
this transponder on "1200 squawk," a code indicating to the tow-
ers on the ground that the pilot is flying under visual flight rules
(VFR).2 Mr. Gaines flew approximately seven hours from
Calaveras, California, avoiding a restricted airspace in Nevada
on his way, and landed in Cordell, Oklahoma, where he was
meeting a friend for dinner.
When Mr. Gaines dropped his eyeglasses case on the ramp, he
did not know that when retrieving it he would be met by a
county sheriff, the first of twenty local and federal law enforce-
ment officers who would keep Mr. Gaines on the tarmac for
about two hours. 2 9 The sheriff told Mr. Gaines that the DHS had
requested a sheriffs deputy to verify the location of Mr. Gaines's
airplane as his flight fit "a certain profile."30
The deputy told Mr. Gaines that the DHS wanted to speak
with him, so Mr. Gaines asked for its number.3 ' Instead of giving
him the number, "the deputy said he was supposed to 'check
[Mr. Gaines's] documents"' and have Mr. Gaines wait until the
DHS arrived by airplane. 2 Then Mr. Gaines had to show the
deputy how to perform a ramp check. 3
Between the pilot-guided ramp check and the arrival of fed-
eral agents, Mr. Gaines took out his cell phone to call his
mother and let her know that he had landed safely.34 In re-
sponse to Mr. Gaines taking out his cell phone, the deputy
"moved toward [Mr. Gaines] and made it very clear [he] was not
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Fallows, supra note 13.
27 Id.; VFR stands for visual flight rules, a set of conditions under which a pilot
may fly using visual cues to avoid collisions and obstacles. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.159 (2014).
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to make any phone calls."" In the end, the deputy did allow Mr.
Gaines to call his mother but listened to the conversation."6
After a total of eight automobiles and two federal aircraft ar-
rived, the final head count was twenty federal and local law en-
forcement officers, seven of whom were dressed in full riot
gear.17 When a border patrol official exited the government's
King Air aircraft, Mr. Gaines was able to ask for more details
about his detention." The official told Mr. Gaines that his flight
fit a "profile" of flying west-to-east from California." The official
then asked Mr. Gaines whether he knew that his hometown was
known for growing drugs.40 Mr. Gaines told the officer he had
not heard that." In addition to asking for Mr. Gaines's medical
and airman certificates, a CBP agent asked him for his weight-
and-balance measurement.4 2 When Mr. Gaines did not have
that-he was not required to according to FAR Part 91 4 -the
agent said that they keep that regulation "in [their] back pocket
for non-compliant suspects.""
An agent with the CBP then asked Mr. Gaines for consent to
search his aircraft. 5 Mr. Gaines refused.4 6 After conferring with
other agents, the CBP official asked if they could take the drug-
sniffing dog around Mr. Gaines's plane. Mr. Gaines consented
to that but did not allow the dog to climb onto the painted area
of the wing, which could have caused costly damage to the
plane's exterior paint.48
After the dog failed to alert its handler to the presence of any









43 Id. Although the FAA requires the aircraft's standard weight and balance
measurement to be onboard, the FAA does not require flight-specific weight and
balance information to be onboard an aircraft. See FAA Order No. 8900.1, supra
note 4, at 69-5(D).
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Gaines asked if up until that point he had not been free to go.5 o
The agent did not answer, but instead only repeated that Mr.
Gaines could leave.
C. INTERACTIONS WITH CONGRESS AND TRADE GROUPS
Mr. Silverstein and Mr. Gaines both reported their incidents
to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) .52 In re-
sponse, the AOPA sought information on the searches of these
and other pilots from the CBP via Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests.53 The AOPA considered the answer they re-
ceived to be an "unsatisfactory" one.5 ' The CBP's response on
May 22, 2013, stated that:
[T]he Office of Air and Marine is charged with protecting the
United States against threats in the air and sea environments pri-
marily along the border and in the drug source and transit zones
used by transnational smuggling organizations. Additionally, Air
and Marine conducts other law enforcement and search and res-
cue efforts, such as responding to tips regarding suspicious activ-
ity in the air or marine environment to protect against threats to
the American people and the nation's infrastructure.
The CBP went on to refuse to provide any specific information
on the stops of AOPA members, citing "the Privacy Act among
other legal and policy considerations. "56
Following that, AOPA sent an additional letter on June 19,
2013, that "question [ed] the authority under which CBP is con-
ducting this monitoring, stop and search activity."5 While wait-
ing for a follow-up response, AOPA created a "kneeboard"
reference guide for pilots to keep in the cockpit and use for
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See David W. Thornton, CBP Searches ofPrivate Aircraft May be Unconstitutional,




55 AOPA Presses Government for Answers, AOPA (May 23, 2013), http://www.
aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2013/May/23/Fresh-reports-of-aircraft-
searches-CBP-has-little-to-say.
56 Jim Moore, Fresh Reports of Aircraft Searches, CBP Has Little to Say, AOPA (May
23, 2013), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2013/May/23/
Fresh-reports-of-aircraft-searches-CBP-has-little-to-say.
57 Jim Moore, AOPA Demands Answers on Aircraft Searches: Federal Agency Silent so
Far, AOPA (June 19, 2013), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/
2013/June/19/AOPA-demands-answers-on-aircraft-searches.aspx.
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help in case of being searched by CBP." In a response to
AOPA's appeal of its FOIA denial, the CBP wrote a response
letter stating that the agency was unable to find records pertain-
ing to Mr. Silverstein's stop at the Iowa airport despite con-
ducting "comprehensive" searches of its internal systems.5 9
According to Craig Spence, AOPA's Vice President of Opera-
tions and International Affairs, AOPA submitted a FOIA request
to local law enforcement that revealed that the local police had
approached Mr. Silverstein's aircraft in response to a call from
another agency."o
Acting Commissioner Thomas S. Winkowski of the CBP re-
sponded to AOPA in a letter dated August 12, 2013, stating: "In
the course of conducting a pilot certificate inspection, facts may
arise meriting further investigation or search to the extent au-
thorized under the Constitution and consistent with federal
law."6 1
U.S. Representative Sam Graves of Missouri wrote a letter to
the Inspectors General of both the DHS and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) on September 9, 2013.62 In his letter,
Representative Graves pointed out that of the multiple requests
made to DHS, CBP, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and others,
no rationale was cited for any of the stops and searches.6 3 Repre-
sentative Graves requested a response by November 1, 2013.64 As
of January 23, 2014, he has only received information that DHS
"doesn't have the capacity to start a review now but will do so
when resources become available."6 ' As far as the DOT, Repre-
sentative Graves "has thus far received no formal, written re-
sponse," although "his office has been in touch to see if the
58 Id.
59 CBP Can't Find Pilot Stop Records, AOPA LIvE, http://www.aopa.org/AOPA-
Live.aspx?watch={A910B212-AD10-4BFD-A664-9EA8B9153CE7} (last visited June
1, 2014).
60 Id.
61 Jim Moore, A Questionable Rationale, AOPA (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.
aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2013/September/04/a-questionable-ratio-
nale.aspx [hereinafter Moore, A Questionable Rationale].
62 Letter from Representative Sam Graves to Inspector Gen. Charles K. Ed-





65 Elizabeth A. Tennyson, Fighting for Your Freedom, AOPA (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2014/February/Pilot/CBP.
aspx [hereinafter Tennyson, Freedom].
376
CBP'S WAR ON PRIVATE AVIATION
[Inspector General of the DOT] will launch an investigation in
light of DHS's refusal.""6
In what was seen by some as "suspicious" timing, approxi-
mately two weeks after Representative Graves's letter and the in-
creased requests for information, 7 the DHS issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register "to exempt [the
Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS)]
records from certain provisions of the Privacy Act."" AMOSS is
used by CBP "to collect and maintain records on publicly availa-
ble aircraft and airport data provided by the [FAA]" as well as
"requests from law enforcement about suspects, tips from the
public, and recordings of event and operations data in a watch
log or event tracking log." 69 Effective on October 18, 2013, the
rule put AMOSS records out of reach of information requests.o
On October 30, 2013, eight U.S. senators wrote a letter asking
for a list of all general aviation pilots stopped since 2009, "rea-
sonable suspicion" that led to their being stopped, and the
"probable cause" that allowed officers to search the aircraft.
The senators expressed concern that "CBP may be violating our
citizens' Fourth Amendment rights."7 2 Although the senators re-
quested a response by November 15, they received nothing.
Two of the senators then wrote a follow-up letter on December
3, 2013." That letter reiterated their request and requested an
answer by December 16, 2013."6
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Privacy Act of 1974; Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and
Border Protection-019 Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System
(AMOSS) System of Records, 78 Fed. Reg. 57402 (proposed Sept. 18, 2013).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Elizabeth A. Tennyson, Senators Demand Answers from DHS, CBP, AOPA (Dec.
4, 2013), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2013/December/4/
senators-demand-answers-from-dhs-cbp.aspx [hereinafter Tennyson, Senators De-
mand Answers].
72 Letter from Senator Pat Roberts et al. to Acting Sec'y Rand Beers of the
Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 30, 2013), available at http://www.aopa.org/-/me-
dia/Files/AOPA/Home/News/All%2ONews/2013/October/Senate%20Letter
%20to%20DHS%20103013.pdf.
73 See id.; Tennyson, Senators Demand Answers, supra note 71.
74 Letter from Senator Pat Roberts and SenatorJim Risen to Acting Sec'y Rand
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On December 23, 2013, CBP issued a sixty-day notice and re-
quest for comments for extending the existing collection of in-
formation pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 122.27, which requires a pilot
entering the United States to present certain documents includ-
ing a pilot's certificate and certificate of registration.7' Requests
for extensions of an existing collection of information are re-
quired under the Paperwork Reduction Act.77 Although rou-
tine," this request reiterates CBP's intention to continue
checking the registration and certificates of aircraft entering the
United States.
AOPA obtained an internal CBP memo that revealed the
agency is calling stops of pilots like Larry Gaines and Gabriel
Silverstein "zero-suspicion seizures."7 9 When pressed for the au-
thority under which it is operating, the CBP cited 14 C.F.R.
§§ 61.3(1) and 91.203.80 The first of those regulations requires
that a pilot present his airman and medical certificates when
asked by law enforcement,"' and the second requires the pilot to
carry an airman certificate.8 2 Neither of those regulations pro-
vides the authority for the CBP to conduct searches without war-
rants or suspicion."
The only place where the CBP can conduct warrantless
searches without suspicion is, not surprisingly, at the border.8 4
The concept of what the "border" is, especially since the advent
of airplane travel, has proven to be a nebulous concept. Courts
have struggled to define what the border is, where it starts and
stops, and in what situations one could be said to have crossed
it.85
76 Agency Information Collection Activities: Documents Required Aboard Pri-
vate Aircraft, 78 Fed. Reg. 77484 (proposed Dec. 23, 2013).
77 The Paperwork Reduction Act and Informations Collections Policy, OFF. CHIEF INFO.
OFFICER, DEPARTMENT COM., http://ocio.os.doc.gov/ITPolicyandPrograms/In-
formationCollection/devOl 003742 (last visited June 1, 2014).
78 See id.
79 Tennyson, Freedom, supra note 65.
80 Id.
81 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(1) (2014).
82 14 C.F.R. § 91.203.
83 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(1), 91.203.
84 United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1982).
85 Id. at 1358-65 (summarizing the various types of border searches and their
development throughout the circuits).
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III. AUTHORITY TO INSPECT AIRCRAFTS
A. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
U.S. citizens have the right to travel through navigable air-
space." To that end, the Administrator of the FAA is required to
"develop plans and policy for the use" of that airspace by
promulgating regulations "necessary to ensure the safety of air-
craft and the efficient use of airspace."" Some of the require-
ments include obtaining airman and medical certificates" and
providing those documents to FAA inspectors and law enforce-
ment (both local and federal) upon request."
The Administrator of the FAA is also empowered to have in-
spectors conduct "ramp checks."O "The objective of this task is
to determine that an airman .. . and/or aircraft is in continuing
compliance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
.... "91 During this ramp check, the FAA inspectors "must always
have their [FAA] credentials available" to produce to the airman
whose aircraft they are inspecting. 2 Section 6-101 of the FAA
Order describing ramp checks provides a list of procedures."
The ramp check begins with the inspection of airman certifi-
cates and medical certificates, their genuineness and legibility,
and any special certificates required based on the type of aircraft
or flight conditions.9 4
The FAA Inspector may also inspect the aircraft for its "gen-
eral airworthiness," paying attention to whether there are
"cracks, damage, and loose or missing fasteners, or other defi-
ciencies that may affect the safety of the flight."" Inside the air-
craft, the inspector is to "[i] nspect seats and safety belts for
proper installation and condition."96
86 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2) (2006).
87 Id. § 40103(b) (1).
88 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(a)-(c).
89 49 U.S.C. § 44103(d).
90 FAA Order No. 8900.1, supra note 4, at 6-89(B).
91 Id. at 6-88; Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains "[FAA] reg-
ulations that govern today's aircraft." FED. AvIATION ADMIN., AVIATION MAINTE-
NANCE TECHNICIAN HANDBOOK, 12-1 (2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/
regulations-policies/handbooksmanuals/aircraft/amt-handbook/media/faa-
8083-30_chl2.pdf.
92 FAA Order No. 8900.1, supra note 4, at 6-89(B).
93 Id. at 6-101.
94 Id. at 6-101(D).
95 Id. at 6-101 (G) (1).
96 Id. at 6-101 (G) (2).
3792014]
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After completing the ramp check, the FAA inspector is sup-
posed to fill out forms that report any deficiencies or noncom-
pliance with Title 14. If there is evidence of noncompliance,
the inspector will report that evidence, and the pilot may face
suspension of his certificates."
B. LoCAL AUTHORITIES
The use of navigable airspace is under the purview of the fed-
eral government." However, local law enforcement has been
empowered by the federal government to inspect airman certifi-
cates and medical certificates.100 Local governments can also
make laws that make certain actions in the operation of an air-
craft a crime under local law (e.g., landing an aircraft on a pub-
lic street outside of an emergency situation).101 Texas, for
instance, makes it a state crime to operate an aircraft without an
airman certificate, thus giving local law enforcement authority
beyond that granted to them by the FAA to inspect a pilot's doc-
uments.'0 2 State law may also require the pilot to present his
airman certificate to local law enforcement, his passengers, or
those in charge of a local airport.1 0 3 The Texas Transportation
Code gives a peace officer the right to inspect an aircraft located
on public property if that aircraft fails to have its identification
numbers on clear display.'" Aside from a pilot committing a
crime, local law enforcement has limited authority over general
aviation pilots. 105
C. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
Since the creation of the Department of the Treasury in 1789,
the U.S. government has controlled the persons and items en-
97 Id. at 6-102.
8 Id. at 6-103; 49 U.S.C. § 44709(b) (1) (2006).
9 "The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the
United States." 46 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (1) (2006).
100 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(1) (3) (2014).
101 TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 24.021 (West 2012).
102 Id. § 24.003.
103 Id. § 24.004.
104 Id. § 24.012(b).
105 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012) (giving officers under the Department of Home-
land Security, including the CBP, power to conduct searches within a reasonable
distance from the border); 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2012) (giving custom officers the
power to search vehicles and persons); 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (giving the Secretary of
the Treasury power to create regulations for the search of persons and baggage).
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tering the country to varying degrees."o6 The U.S. Customs Bor-
der Patrol was established in 1853 when the Treasury Secretary
"authorized the Collectors of Customs to hire Customs Mounted
Inspectors" to patrol the borders."o' Sixty years later, the Depart-
ment of Labor created the Bureau of Immigration and the Bu-
reau of Naturalization.0 s The two bureaus were merged in
1933.109
On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed a
bill creating the DHS.o10 In March 2003, the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) was created as part of the DHS."'1 The
creation of the CBP resulted in several bureaus, including the
Customs Service and the Border Patrol as well as the inspection
function of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, being
merged under the CBP umbrella.11 2 In 2006, the CBP estab-
lished the Office of Air and Marine, billed by the CBP as "the
world's largest aviation and maritime law enforcement
organization." 1 3
Customs' authority to search vessels at the border was first in-
troduced in the Act of July 18, 1866." Since the invention of
the aircraft, the CBP's authority to inspect aircraft comes from
several places. First, under 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(1) and 91.203, a
pilot is required to have and show his airman and medical certif-
icates when asked by local or federal law enforcement."' Be-
yond that, all aircraft arriving in the United States are subject to
search by the CBP." 6 Any aircraft arriving in the United States is
required to present its documents, including a pilot certificate
and certificate of registration."'7 Aircraft arriving from foreign
destinations must also comply with all "advance notification, ar-
rival reporting, and landing requirements" as may be required
106 Timeline, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/







113 Id.; About CBP: Office of Air and Marine, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTEC-
TION, http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/organization/assist-comm_off/amo-assis-
tantcommissioner.xml (last visited June 1, 2014).
114 Current version available at 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1582 (2012).
115 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(1), 91.203 (2014).
116 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012); 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (2014).
117 19 C.F.R. § 122.27.
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by regulation.' 1 8 The CBP undoubtedly has the authority to in-
spect vessels, vehicles, and aircraft coming into the country over
the border.'
The common thread of these regulations and laws is the
CBP's authority to search at the border. However, there are times
when searching a vehicle at the immediate crossing of the bor-
der is impractical or impossible: "For . . . example, a search of
the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis
airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be
the functional equivalent of a border search."o2 0 Regulations
also allow searches in the "external boundary" located a "reason-
able distance" from the border, which is defined as 100 air
miles.' 2' Searches beyond that distance are not reasonable un-
less "unusual circumstances" would permit an agent to search
beyond that.12 2 If an agent conducts such a search, he or she is
required to "forward a complete report" to the Commissioner of
the CBP who "may, if he determines that such action is justified,
declare such distance to be reasonable."123 Beyond a "reasona-
ble distance" from the border, case law has developed several
other tests to determine the "reasonableness" of a search at the
border.124
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER
SEARCH EXCEPTION
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EXCEPTIONS
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'2
118 19 U.S.C. § 1433.
1M9 19 U.S.C. § 1644a(b)(1)(D), (E).
120 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
121 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (2014).
122 Id. § 287.1(b).
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982) (dis-
cussing the reasonableness standard in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
619-20 (1977)).
125 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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The Fourth Amendment does not prevent citizens from being
searched; it prevents them from being searched unreasonably.12
The Supreme Court has held "that searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. "127
There are several scenarios where a warrantless search will be
considered "reasonable": (1) the subject of the search has
granted his or her consent; 1 28 (2) the search of a vehicle where
there is probable cause;'12 (3) exigent circumstances, such as
someone is in imminent danger, evidence may be destroyed, or
the subject may evade officers;1 3 0 (4) incriminating objects are
in plain-view;1 3 1 and (5) the border search exception.13 2
B. BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
The border search exception is not a new concept, but it has
gained exposure in recent months.'13 Since as early as the 1970s,
courts have been sharpening the border search exception con-
cept.134 "Congress has always granted the Executive plenary au-
thority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border,
without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the
collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contra-
band into this country."'3 ' Because of the need to control what
comes into the country, under the border search doctrine "a
governmental officer at the international border may conduct
routine stops and searches without a warrant or probable
cause."'36 Although courts or statutes may outline certain scena-
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("Wherever a man may be,
he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.") (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 357.
128 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
129 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
130 United States v. McConney, 728 F. 2d 1195, 1199, 1205, 1206 (9th Cir.
1984).
13, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
132 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617-19 (1977).
133 See, e.g., Constitution 'Exemption' Zone Spans 100 Miles Inland of US Bor-
der-Judge, RT (Jan. 2, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://rt.com/usa/court-upholds-laptop-
border-searches-041.
134 See, e.g., Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618-19.
135 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 124 (2004).
136 United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993).
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rios where searches are permitted, they must all be "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment.1 3 7
The Supreme Court addressed the concept of reasonableness
as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment and border searches in
United States v. Ramsey.'38 Stressing the importance of border
searches to control foreign vessels and persons, the Court held
that "from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, [bor-
der searches] have been considered to be 'reasonable' by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into
our country from outside."1 3 9 In addressing two seminal deci-
sions, Brignoni-Ponce and Almeida-Sanchez, the Court explained
that "plenary border-search authority" remained intact following
those decisions even though the searches at issue in both were
not upheld.14 0 The Court refused to uphold those searches on
"the express premise .. . that the checkpoint or stop in question
was not [at] the border or its 'functional equivalent." 1 4 1 These
decisions emphasized the Court's refusal to grant the CBP the
ability to search vehicles regardless of their proximity to the bor-
der. By requiring that vessels, vehicles, and aircraft first cross the
border or its functional equivalent, the Court has protected the
Fourth Amendment and provided a check on the CBP's
authority.
Ultimately, Ramsey provided other courts with a balancing test
to determine the reasonableness of border searches.'4 2 In taking
from other past Fourth Amendment cases, not solely border
search cases, the Ramsey Court articulated a two-part test.1 43
First, the Court determined whether the search was authorized
by statute.'4 4 Second, the Court analyzed the reasonableness of
the search under the Fourth Amendment."' To determine the
reasonableness of the search, the Court balanced the weight of
the government's interest in enforcing the statute against the
privacy interest implicated by the search.14 6 For instance, in one
case, the government's interest in protecting the border out-
137 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
138 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 607-08.
139 Id. at 619.
140 Id. at 622.
141 Id. (citations omitted).
142 See United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 726 (citing Ramsey, 431
U.S. at 611-16).
143 Id. at 727.
14 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 612-13.
145 Id. at 611-16.
146 See id. at 615, 623 n.17.
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weighed any privacy concern where a plane crossed the border
without identifying itself and landed in the dark at an isolated
airport. 4 7
The Supreme Court determined the reasonableness of a
search of a sea-going vessel in United States v. Villamonte-Mar-
quez.14 8 The chief issue was "whether the Fourth Amendment is
offended when [c]ustoms officials, acting pursuant to [the] stat-
ute and without any suspicion of wrongdoing, board for inspec-
tion of documents a vessel that is located in waters providing
ready access to the open sea."' 4 9 Using the Ramsey analysis, the
Court determined that search of the vessel in the case at bar was
reasonable considering the high government interest in enforc-
ing documentation requirements of international trade and the
limited intrusion resulting from the brief detention to check
documents.1 5 0 The Court held that because of the vessel's easy
access to the open water, the lack of ability to determine compli-
ance without checking documents, and the "panoply of statutes
and regulations" regulating maritime trade, the interest of the
government was high in favor of being able to search the ves-
sels. 1"' However, "[r]andom stops without any articulable suspi-
cion of vehicles away from the border are not permissible under
the Fourth Amendment, but stops at fixed checkpoints or at
roadblocks are."'5 2
Border searches and seizures became increasingly important
in the 1980s as "drugs primarily transited through the Carib-
bean into South Florida."5 ' Today, however, the primary path-
way for drugs into the United States is the Central America-
Mexico corridor.15 4 Cases addressing the search of private air-
craft in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s were primarily
concentrated in the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits in Florida.1 55
147 United States v. Ivey, 546 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1977).
14 462 U.S. 579, 580-81 (1983).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 592-93.
151 Id. at 589, 590.
152 Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted).
153 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41215, LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG
PROGRAMS 2 (2011).
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
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The facts in those cases involved searches of aircraft primarily in
Florida but also in some other southern states. 5 6
In 1973, the Supreme Court outlined the border search ex-
ception in United States v. Almeida-Sanchez.15 7 In this case, a Mexi-
can citizen holding a valid work permit was stopped without
probable cause twenty-five air miles north of the Mexican bor-
der.' The road ran east-to-west, but "nowhere [did] the road
reach the Mexican border."1 9 The court recognized the "three
types of surveillance" utilized by the Border Patrol: (1) perma-
nent checkpoints; (2) temporary checkpoints; and (3) roving
patrols (the type used in this case). 1 6 0 The government argued
that because of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which pro-
vides for a warrantless search of automobiles "within a reasona-
ble distance from" the border, its search of the petitioner's car
was authorized. 16 1
The Almeida-Sanchez Court then discussed Carroll, its 1925 de-
cision regarding searches of automobiles.1 6 2 It clarified the Car-
roll doctrine, stating that it "does not declare a field day for the
police in searching automobiles."1 63 Most pointedly, it stated:
"Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause
for the search." 164 Although laws and regulations may outline
certain scenarios where agencies may proclaim they are per-
forming reasonable searches, "the Court has insisted upon prob-
able cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search
permitted by the Constitution."'65
In Camara v. Municipal Court, a 1967 Supreme Court decision
involving the inspection of buildings with potential health
hazards, the Court required a warrant, probable cause, or con-
sent of the landowner before the administrative agency could
enter.1 6 6 The search in the Almeida-Sanchez case, the Court
156 See, e.g., United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 101 (6th Cir. 1984) (involving
an airplane landing in Memphis); Garcia, 672 F.2d at 1352 (involving an airplane
landing on Rock Harbor Key in the south of Florida).
157 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
158 Id. at 266.
15 Id. at 267.
-s Id. at 268.
161 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3) (2012)).
162 Id. at 269.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 270 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)).
166 Id. at 270, 282-83 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-36
(1967)).
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warned, "was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the
members of Border Patrol" and "thus embodied precisely the
evil the Court saw in [Camara]."167 Despite the Immigration and
Nationality Act, the Court reiterated that "no Act of Congress
can authorize a violation of the Constitution."1 6 8
To determine the reasonableness of the search, the Court
weighed the government's interest against the "constitutionally
protected interest of the private citizen."16' In weighing the in-
terest of the citizen against the government, the Court found
that the searches at issue were conducted in "areas where the
concentration of illegally present aliens is high," and the
searches were of automobiles, not "persons or buildings," which
it held to be "far less intrusive" than a search of a person or
building.o1 7 In his concurrence, Justice Powell concluded that
"there may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of proba-
ble cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border
areas."1 7 1
The most lasting idea from the Almeida-Sanchez case is the so-
called "functional equivalent" concept of the border.1 7 2 The
Court gave two examples of what "might be functional
equivalents of border searches": (1) "searches at an established
station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of
two or more roads that extend from the border," or (2) "a
search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a
St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City."'7 3 The
Court did not elaborate on the concept beyond those two exam-
ples, stating only that the search in this case was not a "func-
tional equivalent" search.174
The Court clarified Border Patrol's authority to question indi-
viduals about their immigration status in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce.17 1 Immigration officers stopped three people based solely
on the fact that they appeared to be of Mexican descent.'76 Rely-
ing on the same statute as in Almeida-Sanchez, the government
argued in Brignoni-Ponce that it had the authority to conduct war-
167 Id. at 270.
1s Id. at 272.
169 Id. at 289 (White, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 279 (Powell, J., concurring).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 272-73.
173 Id. at 273.
174 Id.
175 422 U.S. 873, 874 (1975).
176 Id. at 875.
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rantless searches absent probable cause because the public in-
terest outweighed the potential threat to privacy.17 7 Reiterating
their reasoning in Almeida-Sanchez, the Court maintained that no
statute could legislate a violation of the Constitution, and that
"the Fourth Amendment demands something more than the
broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government."17
Like in Almeida-Sanchez, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce again
weighed the interests of the public against the need for the gov-
ernment to enforce its borders as compared to the invasiveness
of the search.' 79 The government assured the Court that the in-
trusion in a roving patrol search was minimal, and based on this
minimal invasiveness, the Court held that "stops of this sort may
be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause
required for an arrest."' Weighing all the factors, including the
"importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alterna-
tives for policing the border," the Court held that an officer with
reasonable suspicion of an alien in a vehicle may "stop the car
briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspi-
cion.""' The Court stated that an officer could detain a car to
"question the [occupants] about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status" and give them an opportunity to explain any "suspi-
cious circumstances," but limited further detention to situations
where the officer has obtained consent or where probable cause
is present.'8 2
Perhaps because the Supreme Court did not elaborate on the
"functional equivalent" concept in Almeida-Sanchez, several cir-
cuit courts attempted to tackle this idea in the years following
the decision. In United States v. Brennan, the Fifth Circuit ex-
plored the authority of Customs Agents following a warrantless
search of an airplane at a Florida airport.' 3 The court did not
explore the search in Brennan as a border search but instead
weighed factors of whether the search occurred at a "functional
equivalent of the border."184 The factors considered were: (1)
the presence of "'a high degree of probability that a border
177 See id. at 876-78.
178 Id. at 882.
179 Id. at 879.
180 Id. at 880.
181 Id. at 881.
182 Id. at 882.
18 See United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1976).
18 United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir. 1982).
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crossing took place' and (2) 'an attendant likelihood that noth-
ing about the object of the search has changed since the cross-
ing."'185 Law enforcement in that case received a tip from a co-
conspirator that the airplane was smuggling drugs from Colom-
bia and observed marijuana packages through the aircraft win-
dows.1 8 6 The aircraft had made several flights to Colombia
during the reign of Pablo Escobar,'17 and the pilot had been
jailed in Colombia on drug charges, although he was later
released. 188
Despite those seemingly damning facts, the court held that
"[c]ustoms agents possess no authority to search on less than
probable cause at points removed from the border or its func-
tional equivalent.""' An international flight "brings the border
with it" when it lands in the United States, but there was no
indication here that the flight was from an international destina-
tion."o Following the Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-
Sanchez, the court in Brennan held that "neither agents of the
Border Patrol nor of the Customs Service may conduct a search
on less than probable cause at a point other than the border or
its functional equivalent."191 Despite applying the same law to an
aircraft search as to a vehicle search, the Brennan court declined
to hold "that an airplane is the legal equivalent of an automo-
bile for purposes of search and seizure." 192
The Fifth Circuit tackled a similar set of facts in United States v.
Ivey" but held that the officers had acted reasonably consider-
ing there was a "high degree of probability that a border cross-
ing took place."19 4 The searched aircraft had been in a foreign
country, was spotted by officials in that country, and had filed a
flight plan to Caicos just hours before it had landed for refuel-
ing in Florida in complete darkness." In light of these facts,
customs agents expected the aircraft to either have obtained
185 Id. at 1360 (quoting Brennan, 538 F.2d at 713).
186 See Brennan, 538 F.2d at 713, 714.
187 Pablo Escobar was a drug kingpin and head of the Medellin cartel in Co-
lombia during the 1980s. Pablo Escobar, OFF2 COLOM., http://off2colombia.com/
destination-colombia/about-colombia/pablo-escobar (last visited June 1, 2014).
188 Brennan, 538 F.2d at 713.
189 Id. at 713 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)).
190 Id. at 715.
191 Id. at 716.
192 Id. at 721.
193 546 F.2d 139, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1977).
194 Id. at 140, 142.
195 Id. at 140-41.
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special customs clearance or have proof of clearing customs
prior to landing; this plane had neither. 19 6 Citing Brennan, the
court held that a high degree of probability of a border crossing,
as found in this case, must be present before a border-type
search of an aircraft takes place. 9 Although no actual observa-
tion of a border crossing is required and officials are able to
draw reasonable inferences, the officers must be "'reasonably
certain' that the object of the search has just entered from a
foreign country."1 98
Just four years later in United States v. Stone, the Fifth Circuit
clarified its interpretation of the border search exception when
it upheld a border search where factors that indicated smug-
gling were present.199 The aircraft at issue in Stone came to the
attention of law enforcement after a report of a near-collision in
air and a report from a pilot that he was nearly hit by the aircraft
over the Bahamas.2 0 0 The aircraft was also spotted on radar pass-
ing over the Andros Islands.2 0 1 Most notably, the aircraft was not
operating with its transponder.2 0 2 The aircraft was flying at night
toward the United States from a southeasterly direction, a route
commonly taken by drug traffickers, and had failed to file a
flight plan.2 0 3 The court in Stone distinguished a search requir-
ing probable cause from a functional equivalent border search
where an aircraft has "br[ought] the border with it":
Where an airplane ... has been sighted over foreign land, air or
water and has been monitored continuously thereafter as it
crosses the boundary of this country, its inspection by Customs at
the first point it touches land is fully valid as a border search.
Neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity is necessary to validate such a search. 204
In United States v. Morales-Zamora, the Tenth Circuit held that
when officers use dogs to sniff a vehicle that has actually crossed
196 Id. at 142.
197 Id.
198 Id. (citations omitted).
199 United States v. Stone, 659 F.2d 569, 570, 571 (5th Cir. 1981).
200 Id. at 570.
201 Id. at 570-71.
202 Id. at 571. "[A] transponder is a combined radio transmitter and receiver
which operates automatically relaying data between aircraft and Air Traffic Con-
trol (ATC) on the ground." Tony Bailey, All About Mode S Transponders, AvioNIcs
NEWS, Apr. 2005, at 44, available at https://www.aea.net/AvionicsNews/
ANArchives/April05ModeS.pdf.
203 Stone, 659 F.2d at 571.
204 Id. at 572.
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the border it is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. 2 05
Further, it held that there was no requirement for reasonable
suspicion because the vehicle was lawfully detained at the bor-
der for a search.206
A thorough exploration of the border search exception and
all of its variations is found in United States v. Garcia.2 o' The Elev-
enth Circuit outlined past decisions and determined there were
three basic border scenarios where warrantless searches by the
government are allowed: (1) a limited stop by a permanent facil-
ity located relatively near the border "where practically neces-
sary to control the flow of persons and objects into this country";
(2) occasions where there is a "reasonable certainty that the ob-
ject or person searched has just crossed the border"; and (3)
"searches conducted within the border even after the first practi-
cable detention point where supported by reasonable suspi-
cion."20s The next section will discuss the differences and the
authority underlying each.
C. THE THREE BASES FOR A VALID BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
The first scenario outlined in Garcia is the limited stop by a
permanent facility relatively near the border where practicably
necessary to control the flow of persons and objects into the
21country. 09 Contrary to the other border search exceptions, this
does not require a "showing that the vehicle or item detained
actually crossed the border," assuming, of course, "the location
of the detention and its scope are such as to ensure that it is
necessary for controlling traffic across the border," and "its in-
trusion on the privacy of those lawfully in the country is lim-
ited."21 0 The Garcia court gleaned this exception from United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, a 1976 Supreme Court case involving the
transportation of illegal aliens and searches at fixed points on
the border.2 1 1 The Court in Martinez-Fuerte emphasized a balanc-
ing test: determining that "whether reasonable suspicion is a
prerequisite to a valid stop" is "to be resolved by balancing the
interests at stake." 2 12 The Court distinguished a checkpoint stop
205 United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 201 (10th Cir. 1990).
206 Id. at 202.
207 United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
208 Id. at 1362-64.
209 Id. at 1362-63.
210 Id.
211 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
212 Id. at 556.
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from that of private residences and buildings, like the searches
in Camara.2 1 3 "[S]tops for brief questioning routinely conducted
at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant."2 1 4 Be-
cause of the close proximity to the border, the Court required
less for the search to be considered reasonable than it would
have in a domestic building, vehicle, or aircraft.
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in Martinez-Fuerte
and stated that this decision marked the "continuing eviscera-
tion of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures" by the Court.216 Throughout his dissent,
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's ruling as being
out of line with Almeida-Sanchez and Brignoni-Ponce.1 He argued
that check points 'just as much require some principled re-
straint on law enforcement conduct" as those roving patrol stops
in prior cases. 2 18 To be in accordance with Brignoni-Ponce, Justice
Brennan argued that the majority should "require that Border
Patrol officers act upon at least reasonable suspicion in making
checkpoint stops."219
Justice Brennan found the majority's reasoning especially un-
persuasive because it left the enforcement of "reasonable suspi-
cion" up to individual border agents.2 20 Leaving the decision to
search to be "based merely on whatever may pique the curiosity
of a particular officer is the antithesis of the objective standards
requisite to reasonable conduct and to avoiding abuse and har-
assment."221 Although his vigorous dissent conveyed important
concerns, it has not had an effect on officers who conduct
searches at the border.
The second type of search under the border search exception
is the search conducted at the "functional equivalent of the bor-
der."222 A vessel or aircraft can be stopped after it has entered
the country if the agents are "reasonabl [y] certain [ ] that the
object or person searched has just crossed the border."2 2 ' This
213 Id. at 564-65.
214 Id. at 566.
215 Id. at 552-53, 565-66.
216 Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 568-69.
218 Id. at 570-71.
219 Id. at 574.
220 Id. at 569-70.
221 Id. at 577.
222 United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1993).
223 United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1363 (11th Cir. 1982).
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search must be at the "earliest practicable point after the border
[has been] crossed." 2 2 4 A "practicable" point to search an air-
craft may not be immediately after it has crossed the border
mid-air. 2 25 There is a "practical impossibility" to searching air-
craft in mid-air, so courts will allow this type of search as it is "in
essence no different than a search conducted at the border."2 2 6
The last scenario is the so-called "extended border search," a
search conducted within the border even after the first practica-
ble detention point that is supported by reasonable suspicion.2 27
The key factors in this type of search are that a border crossing
has actually occurred and that conditions have remained un-
changed from crossing until the time of the search.228 Aircraft in
these situations can be said to have "br[ought] the border" with
them.229 Courts have reiterated that the critical factor is that a
border crossing took place.23 o
Courts determine the legality of an extended border search
through a totality of the circumstances test, "including the
elapsed time and distance as well as the manner and extent of
surveyance." 231 The ultimate outcome of the totality of the cir-
cumstances test should lead a factfinder to believe "that there
has been no change of condition" of the searched vessel or vehi-
cle "from the time [it was] loaded at the border until [it was]
stopped, and that whatever was in the [vehicle] when [it was]
searched was in [it] when [it] left the border."2 3 2 If there is any
belief that the conditions of the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft have
changed, the search is unlikely to be found reasonable by a
court.233
Although the court in Fogelman held that the search was a
valid border search, it still required that "[i]n all instances
where a search has been called a border search, a reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle had crossed the border or had been in
contact with those who have done so has been and is re-
224 Id. at 1364.
225 See Cardenas, 9 F.3d at 1147-48.
226 Garcia, 672 F.2d at 1364.
227 United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1978).
228 United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1974).
229 United States v. Brennan 538 F.2d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 1976).
230 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).
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quired." 23 4 This echoed the prior year's Supreme Court decision
in Ramsey, which held that the "critical fact" was that the items at
issue crossed the border."3
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BORDER SEARCH
EXCEPTION CASES
Aircraft and seafaring vessels aside, the media picked up on
the border search doctrine once something more precious was
at stake: our laptops. 236 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
United States v. Cotterman,237 a Ninth Circuit case involving the
forensic search of a man's laptop 170 miles away from the bor-
der." Cotterman, the defendant, was traveling from Mexico to
the United States with his wife. 2 39 Because of a prior conviction
involving children and sex crimes, he was on a list of potential
future predators who frequently traveled to foreign countries.240
His foreign travel put him on the radar of Operation Angel
Watch, a program intended to detect and stop sex traffickers.
At the fixed checkpoint stop, Mr. Cotterman and his wife were
asked inside the Customs Office.24 2 The agents onsite were able
to boot up the laptop but not were able to perform a thorough
search.243 Instead, an officer took it to a secondary search facility
170 miles inland from the border.2 4 4 During that search, the of-
ficers recovered child pornography, and Mr. Cotterman was
charged.245
The initial search of Cotterman's laptop was not in doubt.24 6
The court cited prior decisions involving border searches of
laptops and packages where "cursory scan [s]" of packages, even
234 Id.; see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538
(1983) (holding that reasonable suspicion was the proper standard to apply at
the border).
235 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620.
236 David Kravets, Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling Boltering Gadget Privacy at U.S.
Border, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2014/01 /scotus-border-gadget-searches.
237 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 899 (2014).
238 Id. at 956.
239 Id. at 957.
240 Id
241 Id. at 957-58.
242 Id. at 957.
243 Id. at 957-58.
244 See id. at 958.
245 Id. at 958-59.
246 See id. at 960.
394 [ 79
CBP'S WAR ON PRVATE AVIATION
those requiring a traveler to boot up a computer, were unobtru-
sive enough to be reasonable. With regard to "functional
equivalent" searches, the court cited Almeida-Sanchez for the pro-
position that the functional equivalent exception "effectively ex-
tends the border search doctrine to all ports of entry, including
airports."24 8 The court distinguished the extended border
search from a regular border search based on location .2 49 An
extended border search requires reasonable suspicion and "is
best confined to cases in which, after an apparent border cross-
ing or functional entry, an attenuation in the time or the loca-
tion of conducting a search reflects that the subject has regained
an expectation of privacy."2 5 0 The court concluded that the
search of Cotterman's laptop at the border was not in question
but the search at the forensic laboratory required reasonable
suspicion, which these agents had.2 5 1
V. APPLICATION OF THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE
TO DOMESTIC GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT
The searches of Larry Gaines and Gabriel Silverstein have one
fact in common with some of the cases referenced above. Like
the defendants in several of the cases, the subjects were flying
general aviation private aircraft.52 However, the similarities stop
there. Unlike some of the flights stopped in those cases, the pi-
lots both flew with their transponders on, flew marked aircraft,
and made radio contact directly to a tower or by squawking.25 3
Most importantly, neither Mr. Silverstein nor Mr. Gaines were
coming from foreign destinations.
Absent a constitutionally compliant statute, the conduct of
the officers during the searches of these pilots would likely be
held unconstitutional if examined by a court. Acting Commis-
sioner Winkowski of CBP claimed that when agents are checking
247 Id. (citing United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)).
248 Id. at 961 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973)).
249 Id. at 961-62.
250 Id. at 962.
251 Id. at 966-67, 70.
252 See, e.g., United States v. Brennan 538 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Ivey, 546 F.2d 139, 140 (5th Cir. 1977).
253 See, e.g., Ivey, 546 F. 2d at 140-41; United States v. Stone, 659 F.2d 569, 571
(5th Cir. 1981); Cf Fallows, supra note 13 (noting Mr. Gaines had his transpon-
der on); Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6 (noting Mr. Silverstein filed a flight
plan and obtained clearance for each leg of his trip).
254 Fallows, supra note 13.
2014] 395
396 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE [ 79
documents or "conducting a pilot certificate inspection," of-
ficers may need to conduct "further investigation or search to
the extent authorized under the Constitution and consistent
with federal law." "2 However, neither the Constitution nor fed-
eral law authorized these types of searches. First, "neither agents
of the Border Patrol nor of the Customs Service may conduct a
search on less than probable cause at a point other than the
border or its functional equivalent."25 6 Absent probable cause,
the agents had no authority to perform a thorough search of
either pilot.25' Neither pilot was at a border, so a search by CBP
would need to be the a result of a warrant or fall under another
exception.
The regulations make it clear that the agents are permitted to
inspect both the airmen and medical certificates.258 In accor-
dance with the Supreme Court's decision in Brignoni-Ponce, of-
ficers at the border are limited to "question [ing] the occupants
about their ... immigration status" and giving them an opportu-
nity to explain any "suspicious circumstances."259 Any further de-
tention must be through consent or probable cause.2 0
In both cases, Mr. Silverstein and Mr. Gaines were later
searched by drug dogs.2 6 1 Mr. Gaines gave his consent to have a
drug dog sniff his plane, whereas the agents in Iowa with Mr.
Silverstein took it upon themselves to show up with the dog in
tow.26 2 Dog searches are not considered searches within the
Fourth Amendment context.2 6 3 Furthermore, since Mr. Gaines
consented to the dog sniff, the officers were allowed to search
using the dog even absent the border search exception. 2 64 The
dog sniffing Mr. Silverstein's aircraft in Iowa might have alerted
the officers to something in a luggage case, giving the officers
"probable cause" to search further, because they told Mr. Silver-
stein to open the cargo door as well.265 The frequent misidentifi-
255 Moore, A Questionable Rationale, supra note 61.
256 Brennan, 538 F.2d at 716.
257 See id.
258 See 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(a)-(c), 91.203(a) (2014).
259 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 874, 881-82 (1975).
260 Id. at 882.
261 Fallows, supra note 13.
262 Id.; Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
263 United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 201 (10th Cir. 1990).
264 Fallows, supra note 13.
265 See id.; Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d at 205.
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cation of contraband by canine units is noted, but beyond the
scope of this article. 2 6 6
Most startling of all is the lack of a border crossing in either
case. 2 6 7 Granted, no actual observation of a border crossing is
necessary, but officers must be "'reasonably certain' that the ob-
ject of the search has just entered from a foreign country" in
order for their search to be a valid border search. 66 Even if the
CBP wanted to argue that the search of Mr. Silverstein was an
extended border search, that argument would fail because Mr.
Silverstein's plane stopped for refueling in Colorado prior to his
landing in Iowa.2 6 9 In order for an extended border search to be
valid, in addition to a reasonable certainty that the object has
crossed the border, there must be an "attendant likelihood" that
the object or vessel has not substantially changed since the cross-
ing.o Mr. Silverstein landed for refueling,7  which would have
been enough time for the plane or its contents to have changed.
Under the current state of border search exception law, CBP
likely overstepped its authority in the searches of Mr. Silverstein,
Mr. Gaines, and countless other pilots.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be
reasonable enforces this fundamental understanding in erecting its
buffer against the arbitrary treatment of citizens by government.'9
The CBP and the DHS have refused to provide meaningful
answers to any of the requests for information either by pilots,
the trade association, or even senators and representatives. As
such, the reasoning behind the searches is left to speculation.
After one of the agents who surrounded Mr. Silverstein en-
couraged him to admit to possessing a little bit of recreational
marijuana and another told him his flight fit a west-to-east flight
266 Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, TDibune Analysis: Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Traffic Stops
Often Wrong, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-
0 1-06/news/ct-met-canine-officers-20110105_1_drug-sniffing-dogs-alex-
rothacker-drug-dog.
267 See Fallows, supra note 13.
268 United States v. Ivey, 546 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
269 Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
270 United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Brennan 538 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1976)).
271 See Fallows, supra note 13.
272 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 578 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
273 See Tennyson, Freedom, supra note 65; Thornton, supra note 52.
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profile, 7 one could speculate that these searches are a re-
sponse to the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Califor-
nia and an attempt by the CBP to stop those who would smuggle
it from states where it is legal to states where it is still illegal.
Even if that were the impetus, the enforcement of domestic
drug trafficking would be better handled by the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency.
Although the CBP has claimed authority under the Code of
Federal Regulations allows it to inspect medical and airman cer-
tificates, the searches it performed were premeditated and
went further than a simple inspection. Mr. Gaines returned for
his glasses and was greeted all too quickly by twenty agents, two
government aircraft, multiple vehicles, and a drug sniffing
dog.27' A local sheriff greeted Mr. Silverstein in Iowa and told
him the DHS wanted to speak with him. 7 Neither of these
searches began as simple certificate inspections that then
evolved into something more based on reasonable suspicion. 27 8
The CBP cannot claim that it was performing ramp checks be-
cause (1) it is not authorized to do so under the FAA regulations
and (2) it is not equipped with the skills to perform those
checks properly.7
There is a reason the CBP and the DHS are targeting general
aviation pilots, but the agencies are not sharing that reason with
either the pilots, whose time and patience they are wasting, or
the American people, whose precious Homeland Security re-
sources they are wasting by "calling out the dogs," including gov-
ernment aircraft and agents, to perform these costly "certificate
inspections." Worst of all, these "zero suspicion searches" have
yielded no arrests. Hopefully, if there is a legitimate homeland
security interest in performing these invasive searches, the agen-
cies will give pilots more information. If Congress passes a law
that allows the agencies to promulgate official rules allowing
these searches, pilots would be better equipped to comply. But a
law allowing the CBP to search every general aviation plane fly-
274 Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
275 Dave Hook, I Do Not Consent to Searches, GEN. AviATION NEWS (June 16,
2013), http://generalaviationnews.com/2013/06/16/i-do-not-consent-to-
searches.
276 Fallows, supra note 13.
277 Id.
278 See Moore, Pilot Detained, supra note 6.
279 See Hook, supra note 275.
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ing west-to-east from California would run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment.
These actions by the CBP have flown directly in opposition to
the American people's "public right of transit through the navi-
gable airspace."2 8 0 As an administrative agency, the CBP has dis-
regarded both statutes and the Constitution to achieve a goal
that it has yet to reveal to the American public. The government
has separated the oversight of air travel between several agen-
cies, so when one agency oversteps its authority, the whole sys-
tem is undermined. What pilots and the public need are answers
and reasons, but in the meantime being aware of the CBP's au-
thority, or lack thereof, may be the best defense.
280 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2) (2006).
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